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 Alfano’s reframing of the operationalization of the placebo effect (PE) in the context of informed 
consent (IC) has broader implications for clinical practice, particularly with regard to the 
employment of the concept of authorized libertarian paternalism (Alfano 2015).  
Stigmatization of people refers to the development of a value judgment declaring that a person with 
certain attributes is in some way of lesser status, diminished, or invalid, with resultant negative 
consequences for such individuals. Concepts may also be stigmatized, particularly those that are 
easily falsifiable, including, apropos of the subject of PEs, mesmerism, sugar pills, and sham 
procedures, and hence PEs have historically been regarded with great skepticism, exemplifying 
something dishonest, misleading, “unscientific,” or invalid (Gold and Lichtenberg 2014).  
While recent studies have revealed extraordinary insights into the placebo and nocebo effect (PNE), 
in many ways these insights have had only limited impact upon the practice of medicine or upon 
(negative) views of the PNE. There may be many reasons why this is so. It may be because of the 
inherent conservatism of medicine, the need for medicine to distinguish itself from nonconventional 
practices through its (scientific) method and its capacity to provide an account of mechanism, or the 
intransigence of firmly held views in any field of practice. Indeed, investigators have “long 
recognized that individuals tend to maintain rather than change their stereotypes, despite receiving 
evidence that counters them” (Lyons and Kashima 2003, 989). Enculturation in medicine, in 
particular, systematically reinforces that certain concepts and actions are “foreign” to valid practice 
through a process of stereotype maintenance. Conscious, deliberate, or incidental/unwitting 
utilization of the placebo effect is characterized as deceptive, unethical, unscientific, and 
unprofessional and hence an action that separates physicians from nonphysicians. However, as 
distinct from a modern correlate of mesmerism or purely charismatic practice, there is an extensive, 
well-validated evidence base demonstrating specific psychological and biological processes 
underpinning PNEs (Hall, Loscalzo, and Kaptchuk 2015). This emergent evidence base is not simply of 
passing interest but poses significant challenges to traditionally held beliefs about both the role of 
PNEs in medical practice and about medical practice more generally.  
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For this reason, we believe that it is essential to reconceptualize PNEs within the framework of 
routine clinical care and evidence-based medicine. Ignoring placebo effects as a result of definitional 
negativity will inevitably lead to the “theoretical, empirical, and programmatic difficulties” (Alfano 
2015, 4) that have hitherto led physicians to willingly ignore or fail to consider the role of PNEs in 
their practice. This may impoverish physicians’ understanding of the range of factors that may 
determine their patients’ adherence to recommended treatment regimens, the adverse effects they 
experience, and the outcomes they achieve.  
The teleological ends of any practitioner–patient interaction or intervention are, as Alfano notes, to 
provide benefit and reduce harms to the patient (Alfano 2015). Physicians operate to a greater or 
lesser extent within a biomedical interpretive framework, and their actions are often similarly based. 
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) encourages physicians to employ population data to inform 
individual patient treatments. Because of the difficulty in measuring particular outcomes at a 
population level and generalizing the results of populationderived data to the care of individual 
patients, physicians bound too closely to EBM may employ an epistemologically stunted viewpoint in 
relation to the clinical benefits of treating diseases like hypertension, limiting their assessment of 
benefit to easily quantifiable outcomes such as stroke and death. While it was certainly not the 
intention of the EBM movement to encourage a reductionist and context-independent approach to 
patient care, it is also widely acknowledged that much of medicine is practiced in a manner that 
excludes evidence or otherwise uses poor evidence.  
One of the key issues in EBM is the limitation of understanding of what the evidence actually means, 
particularly to the patient (as discussed by Alfano [2015]). Each health care interaction occurs in a 
very specific context, and in the setting of EBM and IC, there is natural uncertainty as to how one 
distills and applies different forms of evidence in that context. Stigmatizing PNEs by ignoring a robust 
body of literature for their application to clinical care only adds to further uncertainty, particularly 
when considering shared decision making. A genuine dialogue between a physician and an 
empowered patient should enable authorization by the patient for the physician to undertake 
activities that may augment responses/outcomes and also minimize generic deleterious effects 
(Gold and Litchenberg 2014).  
Alfano builds on the notion that unfettered patient autonomy might undermine the ends of 
treatment, particularly in an increasingly data-rich and complex interpretive climate of medical 
practice (McGuire, McCullogh, and Evans 2013). Alternatively, understanding patients’ perspectives 
may assist in directing their autonomy and agency towards beneficence and nonmalfeasance. 
Indeed, noncoercive influencing is based on an appreciation of patients’ conception of their personal 
flourishing, and offers an explanation of how treatment effects might be augmented via expectation 
confirmation, classical conditioning, somatic attention, and feedback.  
The expectation confirmation mechanism noted by Alfano clearly operates in clinical medicine, 
particularly in regard to nocebo phenomena, when exhaustive lists of potential adverse effects are 
typically delivered verbally and supplemented by acontextual consumer medical information. Such a 
negative context can also be reinforced by any bias induced by the physician’s own beliefs regarding 
the balance between efficacy and the risks of harm, which may influence the quality and quantity of 
information given as well as the manner of delivery (particularly the behavioral components of the 
clinical encounter). Taken together, this can leave the patient free to misinterpret the somatic 
sensations that he or she might experience simply as a part of everyday life (Petrie et al. 2014). As 
Fassse and Petrie observe, such priming may mean that the “expectation of treatment side effects is 
consistently linked with those symptoms being realised” (Faasse and Petrie 2013). This has the 
potential to undermine not only current treatment, but in the context of learning processes (such as 
classical conditioning), future therapeutic interactions.  
Destigmatizing the PE necessitates an understanding that “placebogenic mechanisms are not 
alternatives to traditional treatments; they can be used to fine-tune and enhance traditional 
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treatments” (Alfano 2015, 8). In fact, PEs are inherent in routine medical practice, and 
destigmatizing the PNE is an appropriate step in further improving therapeutics. Using a well-
established EBM approach, we would suggest that the PICO (Patient, Intervention, Comparator, 
Outcome) strategy both easily and naturally incorporates contemporary understanding of PNEs:  
Patient: Knowledge of your patient’s problems at biological, psychological and social levels, 
particularly appreciating the application of the literature to the specific therapeutic context, 
without which one lacks a complete appreciation of the different influences on responses to 
treatment.  
Intervention: Consider both the specific intervention itself and how the role of context may shape 
the overall benefit (or harm) of that intervention. In other words, select what represents the 
contextually defined best intervention.  
Comparator: What are the comparative benefits and harms that are identified in the evidence-
based literature that are relevant to the patient in the particular context in which they are 
evaluated.  
Outcome: Determine what outcome(s) the patient desires, and whether these outcomes can 
realistically be achieved in their situation. This represents an important alignment between 
the patient’s expectancies and desires, the physician’s beliefs about outcome and the 
application of various levels of evidence, including at times a potential conflict between 
outcomes which are deemed meaningful in research trials and those deemed meaningful by 
patients and their physicians which would contribute to informed decision making (Bromwitch 
2015, 4). 
Destigmatizing PNEs will provide opportunities to improve clinical outcomes and the ethics of clinical 
care by enhancing beneficence and nonmalfeasance. Research findings over the last decade leave us 
no option but to accept the biological validity of PNEs and acknowledge that they are integral to 
routine care. As Alfano alludes to, modern conceptualizations of PNEs are not about the nefarious 
deceptive administration or omission of treatments, but rather the optimization or management of 
these mechanisms in practice. This is particularly true in light of evidence demonstrating that 
placebo effects can be enhanced even when patients are aware that they are receiving treatments 
that are aimed at augmenting PEs (Kaptchuk et al. 2010). Studies such as these force us not only to 
destigmatize PNEs but also to radically rethink the psychosocial context in which medical care occurs 
and the impact that this may have on patient outcomes. 
If we are at least aware of the emerging literature on PNEs and can accept that “people’s 
preferences and values are to some extent indeterminate, unstable, and context sensitive” (Alfano 
2015, 11), then it is much easier to see that framing and shaping advice is not deceptive when 
undertaken with patient consent. Indeed it is difficult to image how a patient would find 
objectionable a preamble to advice giving that indicated that giving them information in a certain 
way could increase their benefits and reduce their potential for harms from a form of therapy. 
Indeed, it would be ethically objectionable not to do so. As Alfano and others have noted, whether 
physicians “like” it or not, PNEs effects are undoubtedly evoked by and operate within physician–
patient encounters, and if we are committed to using therapies supported by the best currently 
available evidence, then we must destigmatize the PE and harness it to optimize patient outcomes.  
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